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 1 Introduction
Regulating food safety in the domestic food market is an important role of the
government. As international movements of goods and people are growing, protecting the
domestic ecological system from the introduction of non-indigenous or “exotic” species
and pests, which are called “biological invasions,” is also an important policy issue.
Facing these issues, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are necessary to protect
human, animal, and plant life or health from diseases, pests, and contaminants (Roberts,
1998).1 However, these measures may also be used to protect domestic producers
from international competition. As tariﬀs and other forms of classical trade barriers
are progressively dismantled through multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations
over trade liberalization, the temptation to use SPS measures for protectionist purposes
becomes stronger.
There are a number of examples of trade disputes over SPS measures being potentially
used for such disguised protectionist purposes. A famous example is the dispute over
hormone-treated beef between the United States (U.S.) and the European Communities
(EC). In 1980s, the EC banned the use of growth-promoting hormones in cattle and
imports of meat and meat products from animals that had been supplemented with
growth-promoting hormones. In 1996, the U.S. and Canada appealed to the Dispute
Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 1997, the WTO dispute
settlement Panel ruled against the EC as the import ban was not justiﬁed (Roberts,
1998). Other examples include the dispute between the U.S. and Japan over Japan’s
phytosanitary measures on imports of U.S. apples2 and the dispute between Canada and
1SPS measures are deﬁned as measures that “protect human, animal, or plant life and health within the territory of the
Member from risks related to diseases, pests, and disease-carrying or -causing organisms, as well as additives, contaminants,
toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages, or feedstuﬀs” (Roberts, 1998: 382). Roberts (1998) points out that
SPS measures are deﬁned with respect to the regulatory goal of a measure rather than the policy instrument itself. Thus,
SPS measures cover any policy instruments to aﬀect degrees of trade restriction, such as complete import bans, product
and PPM standards, labelling for informing the potential allergenicity of products.
2Japan restricted imports of U.S. apples because Japan was concerned with the spread of ﬁre blight, a bacterial disease
that aﬀects apple trees and other plants in the rose family. However, the WTO dispute settlement Panel issued its report
in which the panel found that Japan’s phytosanitary measures were inconsistent with Japan’s WTO obligations.
2Australia over Australia’s ban on imports of Canadian fresh, chilled and frozen salmon.3
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the
SPS Agreement) of the WTO, which was entered into force in January 1995, prevents
members of the WTO from using SPS measures discretionarily and arbitrarily. The
novelty of the SPS Agreement in GATT/WTO disciplines is to stipulate a scientiﬁc
basis for policies related to SPS. Thus, even though a policy is implemented according to
the principle of non-discrimination (that is, Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) and National
Treatment (NT) principles of GATT), it may be judged to violate the SPS Agreement
if such a policy lacks scientiﬁc basis. Under the SPS Agreement, a scientiﬁcally
“rational relationship” is required between policy measures and their intended goals. The
requirement of scientiﬁc justiﬁcation is expected to contribute to mitigating disguised
protectionism.
The SPS Agreement also requires harmonization of SPS policy of members to
international standards and minimization of negative eﬀects of SPS measures on trade.
On the other hand, the SPS Agreement respects members’ sovereignty over the choice of
their own acceptable level of risk, or the appropriate level of protection (ALOP), which
can be more stringent than international standards, as long as a suﬃcient scientiﬁc
justiﬁcation is demonstrated.4 Even setting the ALOP at “zero risk” can be allowed.
Economists have criticized the SPS Agreements for its lacking economic considerations
in regulating SPS measures. Calvin and Krissoﬀ (1998) argue that the SPS Agreement,
which is rooted more in the risk analysis approach, focuses only on losses to producers
and ignores costs and beneﬁts resulting from SPS measures, which can be measured by
the economic cost-beneﬁt analysis. James and Anderson (1998) criticize that SPS policy
assessment, under the SPS Agreement, is “about where environmental policy assessment
3In 1975, Australia introduced a quarantine measure requiring salmon products to be heat-treated for certain prescribed
durations and temperatures prior to importation. The reason was to prevent the introduction of pathogens that could be
responsible for various ﬁsh diseases. In 2000, a WTO panel found that Australia’s measures aﬀecting imports of Canadian
salmon were inconsistent with Australia’s WTO obligations.
4For example, Australia, Japan, Mexico, and the U.S. inspect some import goods at the point of export in trading
partner countries to reduce their risks, whereas the United Kingdom (UK) inspect at the point of delivery in most cases.
Although the inspection costs are much higher in the former system, it is accepted as appropriate to the risks faced, and
reduces subsequent control costs of diseases and pests (Mumford, 2002).
3was two or three decades ago” (James and Anderson, 1998: 426), looking only at direct
eﬀects and using command-and-control measures. The SPS Agreement pays “virtually
no attention to the impact of SPS trade restrictions on consumer prices” (James and
Anderson, 1998: 426).
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the SPS Agreement
in developing the international trade regime of agricultural and food products. In
particular, this paper tries to investigate how the SPS Agreement can or cannot
successfully deter the use of SPS measures for disguised protectionist purposes.
In order to answer the above questions, I use a simple two-sector, two-country
perfectly competitive general equilibrium trade model developed by Bagwell and Staiger
(1999, 2001). Governments can use two types of policy instruments: tariﬀs and SPS
measures. The use of tariﬀs is restricted by international agreements, which correspond
to GATT/WTO disciplines. The SPS Agreement is captured as a set of restrictions
on SPS measures. In order to clarify the role of the SPS Agreement, I compare the
equilibrium under the SPS Agreement with the equilibrium without the SPS Agreement.
The main ﬁndings of the paper are as follows. Unlike the criticisms by economists
for lacking economic considerations, I demonstrate that the SPS Agreement can play a
role of mitigating disguised protectionism and improving welfare in international trade of
agricultural and food products. Requiring scientiﬁc basis is eﬀective to lead SPS policy
to the economically sound direction.
However, science for SPS risk analysis involves uncertainty (Powell, 1997;
Christoforou, 2000). The academic community may fail to reach a concensus in this
area, as a number of opposing, but equally plausible views, may exist. Due to this
uncertainty, the SPS Agreement may fail to prevent SPS measures from being used for
protectionism purposes.
There are a number of studies related to this paper. First of all, this paper uses
the framework developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001), who analyze the role
of GATT/WTO from an economic point of view. In particular, Bagwell and Staiger
(2001) extend the framework of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) to examine the interaction
4between tariﬀ policy that is directly restricted by GATT/WTO and domestic policy
regarding labour and environmental standards. They show that when the terms-of-trade
eﬀect is the only cross-border externality, the current GATT/WTO rules could enable
governments to achieve eﬃcient policy combinations of trade and domestic policies with
tariﬀ negotiations alone, provided that the market access commitments negotiated in
the WTO are not eroded by unilateral choices of domestic labour and environmental
standards. They demonstrate that the right to bring the “nonviolation” complaints,
which is provided in GATT Article XXIII, is the key to ensuring that governments
achieve eﬃcient trade and domestic policy outcomes with tariﬀ negotiations alone. Their
result implies that GATT/WTO rules need not be broadened to directly handle the
issues of labour and environmental standards in order to achieve a globally eﬃcient
outcome. In this paper, I extend their analysis to clarify the role of the SPS Agreement.
Similar to Bagwell and Staiger (2001), Copeland (1990) explores the interaction between
negotiable and non-negotiable trade barriers. He shows that trade negotiations contain
loopholes which can be exploited by protectionist governments, but are nevertheless
welfare-improving.5 Ederington (2001a) demonstrates that the issue raised by Copeland
(1990) can be solved by allowing environmental duties. That is, if countries are allowed to
set trade policy conditional on the environmental policy of other countries, a fully eﬃcient
outcome can be achieved even if countries set their environmental policies unilaterally.
The linkage between trade and nontrade issues in the context of self-enforcing
international agreements has been analyzed by Ederington (2001b, 2002) and Lim˜ ao
(2005). Unlike Copeland (1990), Ederington (2001b) investigates cooperation over
two negotiable instruments of protection. He focuses on the diﬀerential treatment of
domestic policies and tariﬀs in GATT/WTO rules. In GATT/WTO rules, the use of
domestic policies as a “disguised” trade barrier is prohibited, while tariﬀ protection is
only required not to exceed any “binding levels” that member countries may agree on
and to be nondiscriminatory. In the framework of an inﬁnitely-repeated game in which
5Copeland (1989) also examines negotiation over two instruments of protection, namely tariﬀs and quotas. He shows
that the set of eﬃcient equilibria is essentially identical when either tariﬀs or quotas, but not both, are negotiated. He
also shows that a trade-eliminating war will not occur unless bargaining over tariﬀs is ineﬃcient.
5any deviation in either trade or domestic policy triggers retaliation in both trade and
domestic policies, he shows that diﬀerential treatment is eﬃcient if supply and demand
functions are approximately linear in local prices, because there is no gain from distorting
domestic policy. Since trade policy is the most eﬃcient means of pursuing terms-of-trade
gains, it is also the most eﬃcient means of countering the temptation to deviate from
cooperation. Thus, under the limited enforcement power that prevents implementation of
a fully eﬃcient set of trade and domestic policies, an agreement that requires countries
to cooperate fully over domestic policy and to adjust tariﬀs to satisfy constraints is
self-enforcing.
Ederington (2002) compares linkage and nonlinkage of trade and domestic policies
in self-enforcing agreements. In a “linked agreement,” any deviation in either trade or
domestic policies is punished by inﬁnite reversion to a Nash equilibrium in both policies,
whereas in a “nonlinked agreement” punishment is restricted to the policy in which
the provision is violated. It is commonly viewed that policy linkage strengthens the
punishment to deviation. However, he shows that a nonlinked agreement can support
the same most-cooperative equilibrium as a linked agreement, which implies that linkage
does not necessarily enforce more cooperation. The main reason is that the tariﬀ is
the most eﬃcient instrument to address the terms-of-trade eﬀect, which is the only
cross-border externality in his model.
Lim˜ ao (2005) analyzes whether linkage of trade and nontrade policies promotes better
cooperation in both policies when there is cross-border nonpecuniary externality as
well as the terms-of-trade externality. In the context of self-enforcing agreements, he
shows that if trade and domestic policies are strategic complements, linkage can sustain
more cooperation in both policies than nonlinkage. When two policies are strategic
complements, a country incurs an extra cost when it deviates jointly, which does not
exist if it deviates only in one policy. Consequently, linkage lowers an incentive to
deviate in any given policy and hence it creates enforcement. He demonstrates that
cross-border negative externality is essential for policies to be strategic complements.
Some recent studies examine international agreements from the standpoint of
6incomplete contract (Battigalli and Maggi, 2003; Horn, Maggi, and Staiger, 2006).
Although this approach would be potentially important to understand the role of the
SPS Agreement, that is not the focus of this paper.
This paper is also related to the literature on biological invasion (Horan et al., 2002;
Costello and McAusland, 2003; McAusland and Costello, 2004; Knowler and Barbier,
2005), though the focus is diﬀerent.
Empirical studies on the economic eﬀects of SPS measures include Calvin and Krissoﬀ
(1998), James and Anderson (1998), Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a, b), Wilson,
Otsuki, and Majumdar (2003), and Yue, Beghin, and Jensen (2006). For example,
Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a, b) examine the trade impact of an EC regulation
announced in 1998 that reduced the maximum permissible level of a certain type of
aﬂatoxin (a toxic substance) in food to a lower level than international standards speciﬁed
by the Codex Alimentarius. Their study shows that EU standards, which would reduce
health risk by approximately 1.4 deaths per billion a year, would reduce exports of
cereals, dried fruits and nuts from African countries by 64 per cent or US$670 million,
compared with regulations based on the Codex standards.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 brieﬂy
discusses the background and the main features of the SPS Agreement. Section 3
illustrates the structure of the SPS Agreement from an economic point of view. Section
4 examines the economic eﬀect of the SPS Agreement in the framework of general
equilibrium. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Background
2.1 Before the SPS Agreement
Prior to the SPS Agreement, the original General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade
(GATT) Articles, primarily Article XX, and the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, which is known as the Standards Code, established
multilateral disciplines on the use of SPS measures (Roberts, 1998). However, the
7consensus view was that GATT and the Standards Code were not enough to deter
disruptions of trade in agricultural and food products.
A typical example to show failures of the pre-SPS Agreement legal disciplines is
the unresolved dispute between the U.S. and the EC over the EC’s ban on imports of
hormone-treated meat and meat products during the 1980s. In March 1987, the U.S.
raised the issue of the EC ban under the Standards Code. After six months of fruitless
bilateral negotiations, the U.S. requested the establishment of a technical experts group
to evaluate the scientiﬁc basis for the ban. This request was blocked by the EC, which
contended that the use of hormonal growth promotants in beef production was a process
and production method (PPM) rather than a product characteristic and hence did not
violate the Standards Code. The EC prohibited the import of meat from animals that
had been administered growth hormones but did not refer to the import prohibition of
meat containing growth hormones (Vogel, 1995, Chapter 5; Roberts, 1998).
2.2 The SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round and entered into force in
January 1995. It created new WTO disciplines on permissible trade-restricting measures
related to protection of human, animal, and plant life or health from risks.6 The Technical
Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT Agreement) of the WTO also contains language that
refers to protection of human health and the environment. The TBT Agreement covers
“all technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures,” (Roberts, 1998: 383)
except for SPS measures deﬁned by the SPS Agreement. “The objective of a measure is
thus crucial to the determination whether it is subject to the disciplines in the TBT or
SPS Agreement” (Roberts, 1998: 383).
The main provisions of the SPS Agreement are as follows. Article 2 (Basic Rights
and Obligations) claims that members have the right to take SPS measures necessary
for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health and stipulates that any SPS
6Roberts (1998) points out that animals and plants in the deﬁnition include natural fauna and ﬂora as well as commercial
livestock and crops. Thus, the disciplines of the SPS Agreement apply to measures intended to protect the natural
environment from the risks associated from harmful exotic species.
8measure shall be “applied only to the extent necessary” to the protection, “based on
scientiﬁc principles” and “not maintained without suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence” (Article
2.2).
Article 3 (Harmonization) states that members are encouraged to base their SPS
measures on international standards, where they exist (Article 3.1).7 SPS measures
which conform to international standards “shall be deemed to be necessary to protect
human, animal, or plant life and health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant
provisions” (Article 3.2) of the SPS Agreement and of GATT 1994. However, members
can adopt a measure to provide a higher level of SPS protection than that provided by
an existing international standard “if there is a scientiﬁc justiﬁcation” (Article 3.3).
Article 4 (Equivalence) states that an importing country must recognize an SPS
measure, which diﬀers from its own, as equivalent to its own if the exporting country’s
measure provides the same level of SPS protection.
Article 5 (Assessment of Risk and Appropriate Level of SPS Protection) requires
that any SPS measures be based on a risk assessment, taking into account “risk
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations” (Article
5.1); Article 5.5 requires internal consistency in ALOP, avoiding “arbitrary or
unjustiﬁable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in diﬀerent situations,
if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade”; Article 5.6 stipulates that SPS measures are “not more trade-restrictive than
required” to achieve their ALOP; Article 5.7 states that “if relevant scientiﬁc evidence
is insuﬃcient,” members may adopt SPS measures on a provisional basis.
Article 7 (Transparency) and Annex B state that members are obliged to ensure that
7The SPS Agreement makes speciﬁc reference to three international standard setting agencies (Annex A). For food
safety, it is the “standards, guidelines and recommendations established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating
to food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes
and guidelines of hygienic practice” that are relevant. For animal health and zoonoses, “the standards, guidelines and
recommendations developed under the auspices of the International Oﬃce of Epizootics” (or the Oﬃce International des
Epizzoties: OIE) apply. For plant health it is those developed “under the auspices of the Secretariat of the International
Plant Protection Convention” (IPPC) in cooperation with its regional organizations. For any matters not covered by the
Codex, the OIE or the IPPC, the SPS Committee has the authority to identify “other relevant international organizations
open for membership to all Members.”
9all SPS measures, and proposals for change, are notiﬁed in a transparent manner and
to establish a single national enquiry point which is “responsible for the provision of
answers to all reasonable questions from interested Members.”
2.3 Agri-food trade disputes
For the subsequent analysis of the role of the SPS Agreement, it would be important to
look at the cases involving agriculture and food products, in which the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) found articles of the SPS Agreement were violated. Here, I look
at four major cases.
In the EC-hormones dispute, the WTO Appellate Body (the report was released on
January 16, 1998) found that the EC’s import ban was not based on a risk assessment in
violation of Article 5.1 and that the EC did not provide scientiﬁc evidence to support a
higher level of protection than the Codex international standards in violation of Article
3.3
In the Japan-Agricultural Products II dispute complaint by the U.S., the WTO
Appellate Body (the report was released on February 22, 1999) found that Japan’s
quarantine measures aﬀecting imports of certain agricultural products were not based
on suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence in violation of Article 2.2 nor based on a risk assessment
in violation of Article 5.1.
In the Australia-Salmon dispute complaint by Canada, the WTO Panel (Article 21.5
Panel Report was released on February 18, 2000) found that Australia’s import ban
of fresh, chilled, and frozen salmon was not based on suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence in
violation of Article 2.2 nor based on a risk assessment in violation of Article 5.1, and
was not least trade-restrictive in violation of Article 5.6.
In the Japan-Apples dispute complaint by the U.S., the WTO Panel (Article 21.5
Panel Report was released on June 23, 2005) found that Japan’s import restrictions on
U.S. apples were not based on suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence in violation of Article 2.2 nor
based on a risk assessment in violation of Article 5.1, and were not least trade-restrictive
in violation of Article 5.6.
10In summary, all of the four cases violated Article 5.1 (risk assessment) and three out
of the four cases violated Article 2.2 (scientiﬁc principles). Moreover, two cases violated
Article 5.6 (least trade-restrictive).
3 The structure of the SPS Agreement
In this section, I illustrate the structure of the SPS Agreement from an economic point
of view. In particular, I show how the usual economic analysis of price and quantity is
transformed into food risk in the evaluation of SPS policy under the SPS Agreement.
Consider that a country imports good x, or food, which is subject to SPS policy. Let
Dd, Sd,a n dSf be domestic demand for, domestic supply of, and import supply of good
x, respectively. Let pw and p be world and domestic price of good x, respectively.
Good x may contain some “hazard,” which is a “biological, chemical or physical agent
in, or condition of, food with the potential to cause an adverse health eﬀect” (Codex,
2003: 51). Thus, a possible contamination of a hazard in good x causes a health risk to
consumers. In this situation, some SPS policy is required to achieve a certain level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection (which means the protection of human, animal or
plant life or health), or SPS protection. I assume that the SPS protection level that is
attained by some SPS policy is measured by the corresponding risk level R. The smaller
R lower the risk, i.e., R = 0 means zero risk. The SPS protection level in this country
depends on the total amount of hazard intake. Suppose that consumers in this country
take the total amount of Hx of hazard by consuming good x. Then, the risk level R
can be expressed as a function of Hx, R(Hx). Let hx be per unit hazard intake. Then,
Hx = hx × x holds.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship among food consumption, hazard intake, and risk.
The risk level R is measured along the upper side of the vertical axis. The right-hand-side
of the horizontal axis measures the level of hazard intake Hx. The ﬁrst quadrant
shows the relationship between hazard intake and risk. The upward-sloping curve is
the function R(Hx).8 Since the lower side of the vertical axis measures quantity of food
8Although an example of R  (Hx) > 0 is drawn in Figure 1, this is not necessarily the case.
11consumption and production, the fourth quadrant shows the relationship between the
amount of food consumption and hazard intake. The slope of the line in the fourth
quadrant is per unit hazard intake hx. This line could be rotated by the implementation
of SPS measures. Moreover, the food price is measured along the left-hand-side of the
horizontal axis. Thus, the third quadrant shows the usual relationship between price
and quantity. The domestic demand and supply curves are depicted. The supply from
abroad is given by a straight line. The implementation of SPS measures could shift the
domestic supply and the foreign supply. It may also shift the domestic demand, because
the implementation of SPS measures may alter consumers’ assessment of food safety.
In this way, under the SPS Agreement an SPS policy is assessed by transforming the
market outcome (i.e., a combination of price and quantity) into the risk level through
taking hazard intake into account.
The relationship between the SPS protection level implied by international standards
and the ALOP of the country is also depicted in Figure 1. In this ﬁgure, hazard intake
under international standards and the corresponding risk level are indicated as Hx = ¯ H
and R = ¯ R, respectively. The acceptable level of risk chosen by the government of the
country is indicated as “ALOP.” Here, I consider a case in which the country chooses a
more stringent ALOP than ¯ R. Hx = Hb is the level of hazard intake to attain the ALOP.
In this ﬁgure, I show an example of excessive SPS measures. In the fourth quadrant, a
line labelled as “Without SPS” depicts the case of no SPS measure being implemented.
On the other hand, a line labelled as “With SPS” depicts the case of an SPS measure
being implemented. Thus, without SPS measure, the domestic consumption is x = xn,
resulting in hazard intake of Hx = Hn. The attained risk level is R = Rn,w h i c hi s
higher than the international standard R = ¯ R. If an introduced SPS measure rotates
down the line in the fourth quadrant to the line labelled as “With SPS”, the domestic
consumption is decreased to x = xs and the corresponding hazard intake is decreased
to Hx = Hs. This level of hazard intake achieves the risk level of R = Rs,w h i c hi s
lower than ALOP. This kind of an excessive SPS policy is considered to violate the SPS
Agreement.
124 A general equilibrium analysis
In the previous section, I analyze the structure of the SPS Agreement in the framework
of partial equilibrium. In this section, I extend the analysis to a model of general
equilibrium, so that the role of the SPS Agreement in international trade in food is
further examined.
4.1 The basic framework
I use the two-sector, two-country perfectly competitive general equilibrium trade model
developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001). There are two countries: home and
foreign. Variables of the foreign country are indicated by an asterisk (∗). There are two
goods: x and y. All markets are perfectly competitive. Let x be the natural import good
of the home country and y be the natural import of the foreign country. Let p ≡ px/py
and p∗ ≡ p∗
x/p∗
y be local relative prices in the home and foreign countries, respectively.
Let t and t∗ be ad valorem import tariﬀs imposed by the home and foreign governments,
respectively. Deﬁne τ ≡ 1+t and τ∗ ≡ 1+t∗. Then, I have p = τpw ≡ p(τ,pw)a n d
p∗ = pw/τ∗ ≡ p∗(τ∗,p w), where pw ≡ p∗
x/py is the world relative price. Note that the
home country’s terms of trade are measured by 1/pw and the foreign country’s terms of
trade are measured by pw.
I assume that both goods are potentially aﬀected by SPS measures.9 In order to
focus on the situation in which trade disputes occur in the real world, I only consider
SPS measures with regard to import goods.10 Let S be a set of SPS measures. Let sx
and s∗
y be SPS measures imposed by the home and foreign governments with regard to
their import good, respectively, where sx,s ∗
y ∈ S.
A country’s SPS measures could potentially aﬀect both its import demand and the
9For example, in the case of hormone beef dispute in the period of the pre-Uruguay Round, when a ban imposed by
the EC on imports of hormone-treated beef went into force in 1989, the U.S. implemented retaliatory measures in the
form of 100 per cent duties on some EC products, such as beef, tomatoes, and fruit juices.
10Some SPS measures are also employed towards export goods. However, trade disputes involving SPS measures
usually occur when importing countries impose more stringent SPS measures than exporting countries do. Thus, it is
not interesting from a practical perspective to analyze SPS measures with regard to exporting goods. I assume that SPS
measures with regard to export goods are set at some basic level.
13other country’s export supply. For example, Japan allows imports of beef from the U.S.
and Canada only from cattle aged 20 months or younger in order to address the issue
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). This type of SPS measure aﬀects import
demand. On the other hand, Japan introduced new standards on residue of pesticide,
feed additives, and veterinary drugs in May 2006. The new standards could particularly
aﬀect Japan’s imports of food from China. This type of SPS measure not only aﬀects
Japan’s import demand but also could aﬀect China’s export supply. Actually, SPS
measures aﬀecting export supply and those aﬀecting import demand have quite diﬀerent
eﬀects. Here, I focus on the SPS measures that aﬀect import demand.
For the home country, imports of x are represented as Mx(sx,p(τ,pw),p w) and exports
of y are denoted as Ey(p(τ,pw),p w). Foreign imports of y, M∗
y and foreign exports of
x, E∗
x are deﬁned analogously. In these import demand and export supply functions of
the home and foreign country, sx and s∗
y act as shift parameters. From the conditions of























The equilibrium world price ˜ pw(τ,sx,τ∗,s ∗











with market clearing for y. I assume that the Marshall-Lerner stability conditions are
satisﬁed, so that an inward shift of the home (respectively, foreign) import demand curve
will result in a lower (respectively, higher) equilibrium world price. Following Bagwell
and Staiger (1999, 2001), I also assume that dp/dτ > 0 >d p ∗/dτ∗ to avoid the Metzler
paradox and ∂˜ pw/∂τ < 0 <∂˜ pw/∂τ∗ to avoid the Lerner paradox.
Furthermore, it will be reasonable to assume that an increase in SPS measures reduces




















4.2 Social welfare and SPS protection level from risks
Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001), I represent social welfare of the home
and foreign country by general functions W(sx,p(τ,˜ pw), ˜ pw)a n dW ∗(s∗
y,p(τ∗, ˜ pw), ˜ pw),
respectively. As in Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001), I assume that, holding local prices
and SPS measures ﬁxed, an improvement in terms of trade increases social welfare of
the country, that is,
∂W(sx,p,˜ p
w)/∂p






w > 0. (6)
On the other hand, the acceptable level of risk or the SPS protection level from risk
to human, animal or plant life or health that will be achieved by implementing an SPS
measure in the home country is denoted as R ∈ [0,R Max]. A higher value of R means a
higher risk and R = 0 means risk free. The relationship between sx and R is represented
by a function R = f(sx), which is assumed to be non-increasing in sx. Similarly, the
SPS protection level in the foreign country is denoted as R∗ = f(s∗
y).
4.3 Eﬃcient policy choices
Eﬃcient policy choices are identical to those shown by Bagwell and Staiger (2001). That
is, any eﬃcient policies (τE,s E
x,τ∗E,s ∗E













w) ≥ ˜ W
∗E,
where ˜ W ∗E ≡ W ∗(s∗E
y ,p(τ∗E, ˜ pwE), ˜ pwE)a n d˜ pwE ≡ ˜ pw(τE,s E
x,τ∗E,s ∗E
y ). The


































where subscripts mean partial derivatives and A ≡ (1 − τλ)/(Wp + λWpw)a n dA∗ ≡
(1 − λ∗/τ∗)/(W ∗









See Bagwell and Staiger (2001) for detailed discussion on those FOCs.
The only thing that Bagwell and Staiger (2001) did not do is to deﬁne the eﬃcient








4.4 GATT/WTO disciplines with the SPS Agreement
I now turn to the case in which the SPS Agreement is entered into force. In this case,
in addition to the tariﬀ negotiation, choices of SPS measures are also restricted by the
SPS Agreement.
First of all, the SPS Agreement requires each country to set its own ALOP. Let ¯ R
and ¯ R∗ be ALOPs of the home and foreign country, respectively. The SPS Agreement
requires harmonization of ALOPs to international standards. Let ¯ Rw
x and ¯ Rw
y be the SPS
protection levels with regard to x and y, respectively, set by the relevant international
organizations, such as the Codex, the OIE, and IPPC. Then, the SPS Agreement requires
¯ R ≥ ¯ Rw
x and ¯ R∗ ≥ ¯ Rw
y . However, it also allows ALOPs to be more stringent than ¯ Rw
x or
¯ Rw
y , if there is a scientiﬁc justiﬁcation.
Secondly, the SPS Agreement requires scientiﬁc basis and appropriate risk analysis for
SPS measures. This implies that each country is responsible for demonstrating “rational
relationship” between ALOPs and SPS measures. I deﬁne the following three cases: (a)
If ¯ R>R= f(s), it is said to be overprotective;( b )I f¯ R = R = f(s), it is said to be
just protective;( c )I f¯ R<R= f(s), it is said to be underprotective. Case (a) means
that the actual SPS protection level resulting from implementing an SPS measure s is
higher than the ALOP set by the government. Case (c) is the opposite case. Case (b)
16means that an SPS measure s is just enough to achieve the ALOP. The SPS Agreement
requires that (b) is the case.
Finally, the SPS Agreement requires SPS measures to be least trade-restrictive. This
implies that if there exist s 
x,s   
x ∈ S such that R  = f(s 
x)a n dR   = f(s  
x)a n dR  =
R   ≡ ˆ R, then the home country has to choose s 
x such that Mx(s 
x,p,p w) ≥ Mx(s  
x,p,p w)
for all s  
x such that ˆ R = f(s  
x). A similar rule applies to the foreign country.
Now, I am ready to prove the ﬁrst result regarding the economic eﬀects of the SPS
Agreement. Let (¯ τ,¯ τ∗,s u
x,s ∗u
y ) be a combination of policies in Nash equilibrium without
the SPS Agreement. Denote Ru = f(su
x)a n dR∗u = f(s∗u
y ). Then, the following
proposition is obtained.
Proposition 1 Assume that there is a negotiated pair of tariﬀ bindings (¯ τ,¯ τ∗).S u p p o s e
that ¯ R and ¯ R∗ conform to ¯ Rw
x and ¯ Rw
y .
(i) Consider ¯ Rw
x and ¯ Rw
y such that Ru < ¯ Rw
x ≤ RE and R∗u < ¯ Rw
y ≤ R∗E.I f
dW/dτ∗ < 0 and dW ∗/dτ < 0 hold at the non-cooperative choices of SPS measures,




y ), improves social welfare of both countries, compared to the case without an SPS
Agreement;
(ii) If (¯ τ,¯ τ∗)=( τE,τ∗E) and ¯ Rw
x = RE and ¯ Rw
y = R∗E hold, the SPS Agreement
together with tariﬀ negotiations achieves eﬃcient outcomes.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the SPS Agreement actually has a positive economic
eﬀect, provided that at the equilibrium point without SPS Agreement each country
would be hurt by a unilateral increase in its trading partner’s tariﬀ. The SPS Agreement
reduces SPS measures that would be otherwise set at higher level for manipulating terms
of trade, contributes to a freer trade, and improves welfare in the world, compared to
the case without an SPS Agreement.
The next result, however, show that the SPS Agreement in the current form is not
enough to guarantee an eﬃciency gain.
17Proposition 2 Given a negotiated pair of tariﬀ bindings (¯ τ,¯ τ∗),i f ¯ Rw
x and ¯ Rw
y such that
Ru < ¯ Rw
x ≤ RE and R∗u < ¯ Rw
y ≤ R∗E, a country has an incentive to set its ALOP more
stringent than ¯ Rw
x or ¯ Rw
y , or to implement an overprotective SPS measure.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that a country has an incentive to unilaterally increase its
actual SPS protection level from international standards. There are two ways to achieve
this: the ﬁrst option is to set its ALOP higher than international standards; the second
option is to make its ALOP conform to international standards but implement SPS
measures that will realize a higher level of SPS protection than the ALOP. Although the
second option is prevented by the SPS Agreement, the ﬁrst option may be feasible under
the SPS Agreement.
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement allows each country to set its ALOP higher than
¯ Rw as long as a scientiﬁc justiﬁcation is provided. However, the state of science for
SPS risk assessment is highly uncertain (Powell, 1997).11 The Appellate Body of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the case of hormone beef dispute argued that the
scientiﬁc evidence to support a particular SPS measures is not necessarily based on the
“mainstream” scientiﬁc opinion (Pauwelyn, 1999). Governments can base their SPS
measures on “a divergent opinion coming from qualiﬁed and respected sources” (WTO,
1998). It would be suﬃcient for a country to demonstrate a “rational relationship”
between the SPS measure and the risks it mitigates in order to justify a particular SPS
measure (Roberts, 1998). “The Appellate Body clariﬁed that even minority opinions
could provide this ‘rational relationship’ ” (Pauwelyn, 1999: p. 649). This implies
that various ALOPs and SPS measures can be justiﬁed by diﬀerent scientiﬁc evidence.12
Thus, scientiﬁc uncertainty might be exploited by disguised protectionism.
11This is particularly true for biological stressors. Powell (1997) argues that “there may be large, irreducible uncertainties
in predicting the eﬀects of biological stressors” (p. 5) because, unlike chemical stressors, biological organisms grow,
reproduce, disperse both actively and passively, interact with ecosystems in ways that are hard to predict, and evolve
largely randomly (Simberloﬀ and Alexander, 1994).
12Christoforou (2000) argues potential procedural issues at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO when
science-based trade disputes are dealt with. He points out that the procedural rules of the DSB may contribute to
multiple or biased views over scientiﬁc information.
185 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have analyzed the role of the SPS Agreement of the WTO, which is aimed
at preventing WTO members from using SPS measures discretionarily and arbitrarily,
from an economic point of view. The SPS Agreement relies mainly on the risk analysis
paradigm, which is based on scientiﬁc justiﬁcation, rather than the economic paradigm.
For that reason, economists have often criticized the SPS Agreement for lacking economic
sense.
The analysis in this paper, however, has demonstrated that the SPS Agreement could
play a role of improving social welfare in the world. As long as the SPS protection
levels are set at some proper levels by the relevant international organizations, the
SPS Agreement induces reciprocal reductions in SPS measures of both countries from
their unilaterally optimal levels, leading to an improvement in economic welfare of both
countries.
However, a potential drawback of the SPS Agreement arises from its reliance on
the risk analysis paradigm. Science involves uncertainty. Owing to the uncertainty
of science, the SPS Agreement leaves room for countries to use SPS measures for
disguised protectionist purposes or they may become an obstacle to implementation
of welfare-improving SPS measures.
19Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .( i )L e tsw
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y ), respectively. Then, although sw
x and s∗w
y may not be uniquely determined,









x)a n d ¯ Rw
y = f(s∗w
y ). Since (¯ τ,¯ τ∗) is binding, governments cannot increase
tariﬀs in response to decreases in sx and s∗
y.
Given the partner country’s SPS measure, the best-responses of the home and foreign
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y (sx;¯ τ,¯ τ∗) be the best-responses of the home and foreign
country, respectively, which satisfy (A1) and (A2), respectively. By assumption (6),
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Then, from (5) these inequalities imply that sBR
x (s∗w





the point where sx and s∗
y satisfy (A1) and (A2), respectively, a marginal change in sx
(respectively, s∗
y) has no ﬁrst-order impact on W (respectively, W ∗). The impacts of a










































the assumptions of dW/dτ∗ < 0a n ddW ∗/dτ < 0 with assumption of ∂˜ pw/∂τ < 0 <
∂˜ pw/∂τ∗ implies that (τWp + Wpw) < 0a n d( W ∗
p∗/τ∗ + W ∗
pw) > 0. Then, from (5)
dW/ds∗ < 0a n ddW ∗/ds < 0 hold, which establishes the intended result.
20(ii) If (¯ τ,¯ τ∗)=( τE,τ∗E)a n d ¯ Rw
x = RE and ¯ Rw




y must hold. By Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, sx and s∗
y must satisfy




















y denote home and foreign import volumes associated with a
combination of the eﬃcient policies (τE,s E
x ,τ∗E,s ∗E
y ). Then, conditions (1) through













y) ≤ ˜ p
wE, (A6)
respectively, where ˜ pwE denotes the equilibrium world price associated with a
combination of the eﬃcient policies (τE,s E
x,τ∗E,s ∗E
y ). Under assumption (6), for a given
s∗
y, the home government will choose sx such that ˆ pw(τE,s x,τ∗E,s ∗
y)=˜ pwE. Similarly,
for a given sx, the foreign government will choose s∗
y such that ˆ pw(τE,s x,τ∗E,s ∗
y)=˜ pwE.
This implies that the combination of (sx,s ∗
y) in Nash equilibrium is (sE
x,s ∗E
y ).
Proof of Proposition 2.G i v e n( ¯ τ,¯ τ∗)a n d ¯ R∗ = ¯ Rw
y , if the home government sets ¯ R< ¯ Rw
x,
under the assumption (4) an SPS measure that corresponds to ¯ R = f(sx) yields
Mx(sx,p(¯ τ,˜ p
w(¯ τ,sx, ¯ τ
∗,s
∗w
y )), ˜ p
w(¯ τ,sx, ¯ τ
∗,s
∗w





where ˜ pwR ≡ ˜ pw(¯ τ,sw
x, ¯ τ∗,s ∗w
y ). Then, under the stability assumptions, (A7) implies that
˜ p
w(¯ τ,sx, ¯ τ
∗,s
∗w
y ) < ˜ p
wR.








holds. When ¯ R = ¯ Rw
x, an overprotective sx, which yields f(sx) < ¯ R produces the same
result. The case of the foreign country is proved in an analogous way.
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Figure 1: Food consumption, hazard, and risk
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